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On the historical background 
As is well known, the concepts of bona fides and boni mores originate in Roman 
law. Before examining their fate in the socialist Hungarian civil law, it is necessary 
to refer briefly to the relationship between Hungary and the Roman law tradi-
tion. Until the middle of the 19th century, the Hungarian legal system did not 
belong to civil law jurisdictions. Apart from during the Roman times, Roman law 
has never been the law in effect in Hungary. In the Middle Ages as well as in the 
early modern period, Hungary had a conservative national customary law 
strongly characterised by feudalistic features. In these times, Roman law only had 
a limited impact on the development of Hungarian law (Bónis, 1964; Zlinszky, 
1983, pp. 56ff; Hamza, 2009, pp. 366ff ). 
The modernisation of Hungarian law in terms of the reception of the Roman law 
tradition—I am speaking now about private law—began in the 19th century. 
Hungarian private law acquired a civilian (Roman law) character due to the in-
troduction of the Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ABGB) in 
1853. Some years later, the ABGB was repealed but, as a matter of course, it was 
hardly possible to return to the old Hungarian private law. Judicature and other 
factors of legal development aimed for the creation of a modern Hungarian private 
law, mainly on the basis of German law (besides the impact of the Pandectists, it was in 
a certain period especially the Saxon Civil Code of 1863 which was regarded as a 
model  code for developing the Hungarian private law), but the Austrian law and later 
(after the First World War) sometimes the Swiss law were taken into consideration as 
well.1 At the end of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century, 
several drafts of a Hungarian Civil Code were elaborated, even presented as bills to the 
Hungarian Parliament, but they were never adopted. Among these drafts, especially 
the last one, the Private Law Code of Hungary in 1928 is to be stressed, not only 
because of its high professional level, but also because of its considerable impact on the 
judicature, which tacitly recognised it as an effective source of law (cf. Zlinszky, 1983, 
p. 65; Földi, 1988, pp. 364ff; Képes, 2016, pp. 112f ). 
As far as the social-historical context of the development of Hungarian 
private law before the First World War is concerned, it is to be noted that 
this development took place within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. After the Compromise between Austria and Hungary was con-
cluded in 1867, a golden age began for Hungary for some decades when both 
the economy and culture developed to a great extent (Rigó, 2017). These 
decades were dominated by the increasing influence of liberal ideas. In this 
context, it is important to refer to the emancipation of Jews in Hungary (Act 
No. XVII of 1867) and to their continuously growing role in the Hungarian 
economy and society. The Tiszaeszlár blood libel trial in 1882 and 1883 
showed the presence of antisemitism in Hungary, but in spite of antisemitic 
agitation, the rule of law triumphed. 
Unfortunately, the First World War did not only break the belle époque, it also 
led to the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918. It is not so much the 
emergence of new national states that is to be lamented in this respect but rather 
the loss of a number of high values, especially the devaluation of liberal ideas, not 
to mention socialist ones. 
The definitive end of the liberal period of the former decades was marked by a 
short communist intermezzo that took place in 1919, namely, the formation of 
the first communist regime in Hungary on the March 21, 1919. The so-called 
‘Hungarian Soviet Republic’ led by Béla Kun (1886–1938) had extremist ideas 
and applied terrorist means. It collapsed after 133 days. Since the majority of 
communist politicians leading the Soviet Republic of 1919 were of Jewish origin, 
albeit they were not members of the Jewish community, antisemitism in 
Hungary became stronger in the interwar period and it became a part of gov-
ernment policy as early as 1920 (Karady and Nagy, 2012). 
The restoration of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1920 was possible in a territory 
reduced to two-thirds of its original size. Due to the Trianon Treaty of 1920, 
Hungary lost not only large and important territories, but also more than a 
quarter of native Hungarians suddenly found themselves outside of Hungarian 
borders, mainly in Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. After such ante-
cedents, from 1920 a national Christian course prevailed in Hungarian politics, 
characterised by strong anticommunism and increasing antisemitism as well 
as antiliberalism. 
In the framework of the present study, I can refer only briefly to the tragic 
events of the Second World War and of the Holocaust that afflicted Hungary to 
a tragically great extent. The political and moral responsibility of the Hungarian 
governments and other influential political factors should not be under-
estimated in this respect. Between September 1944 and April 1945, the terri-
tory of Hungary was liberated or, as it turned out later, occupied by the Soviet 
Red Army. Soviet troops left the country only after the fall of communism in 
1991. The Hungarian Communist Party took power in 1948 and in the same 
year the communist (called ‘socialist’) transformation of the Hungarian legal 
system began. 
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Creation of the first Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 
In this transformation process, the greatest task was the creation of the first Civil 
Code of Hungary. The codification works began in 1953 and it was on July 30, 
1959, that the Parliament adopted the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of 
Hungary as Act No. IV of 1959. The Civil Code entered into force on May 1, 
1960, and after several amendments remained in force until March 15, 2014, 
when the new Civil Code (Act No. V of 2013) entered into force. 
Hungary in the 1950s as well as other socialist countries in Europe experi-
enced a dark era characterised by massive brutality from the communist party, 
which made use of the state organs. On the other hand, there were a number of 
highly qualified jurists who had, fortunately, an important role in the gigantic 
project of civil law codification in Hungary. As we know from history, legal 
science (or at least the validity of private law) and a totalitarian regime do not 
necessarily exclude each other. The classical Roman jurists as well as the excellent 
jurists of Justinian worked in an autocratic empire (cf. Honoré, 
1973–1974, p. 869). 
As for the preparation of the first Hungarian Civil Code (Act No. IV of 1959), 
which began in 1953, its main drafters were Miklós Világhy (1916–1980), Gyula 
Eörsi (1922–1992), Endre Nizsalovszky (1894–1976), Elemér Pólay (1915–1988), 
and Béla Kemenes (1928–2000). Nizsalovszky was perhaps the greatest Hungarian 
private lawyer of his time. From 1938 he was the Professor of Civil Procedure Law 
at the University of Budapest, and from 1943 he was also Professor of Private Law 
there. He was a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences from 1939. He is 
mentioned in third place in the list given above because as a non-communist, he 
could have only a limited influence on the actual codification. 
It was in fact remarkable in those times that Nizsalovszky was invited to the 
codification committee at all. Many of his colleagues, having been labelled 
‘bourgeois scholars,’ were forced to retire between 1945 and 1950; if they had 
been members of the Academy of Sciences, as a rule they lost their membership. 
Nizsalovszky, however, was an extremely renowned legal scholar, and he was, 
moreover, politically more liberal than conservative being by no means hostile 
towards progressive ideas prior to the Second World War.2 
The leading members of the codification committee were Világhy and Eörsi. 
Formerly as law students they had been Nizsalovszky’s pupils. A semi-official letter 
written by Nizsalovszky to Eörsi in 1954 attests that the esteemed professor 
treated his young colleague as a good friend (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 16, 
pp. 1146ff ). In spite of their ‘bourgeois’ family background, both Világhy and 
Eörsi as persons open to new ideas—Eörsi being in addition a Holocaust 
survivor—became convinced communists after 1945. They were appointed 
Professors of Civil Law at the University of Budapest in 1953 and later also became 
members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The fact that the Civil Code of 
1959, despite some socialist institutions, remained a Romanistic one is especially 
due to Világhy and Eörsi who, possessing a certain political influence, could 
successfully insist that a number of classical traditions of private law be preserved. 
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At this point, the Soviet jurists to some extent controlled to what extent 
socialist principles were present in the new Hungarian Civil Code. A well- 
known Soviet jurist, Anatolii Venediktov (1887–1959), professor at 
Leningrad State University and member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (cf. 
Benevolenskaya, 2013, pp. 173ff ), sent a letter containing general observa-
tions on the draft of the new Hungarian Civil Code in December 1957. 
Venediktov welcomed the fact that the new Hungarian Civil Code as the 
first socialist civil code would not contain a general part (cf. Baldus and 
Dajczak, 2013).3 Venediktov adds, however, that just that is why the pre-
liminary provisions should be more detailed than in a civil code having also a 
general part. Lacking a Russian translation, Venediktov, as he himself ob-
served, was not in a position to ascertain whether the preliminary provisions in 
the Hungarian draft contained to a satisfactory extent the principles of so-
cialist civil law, even if taking into account the current lower stage of the 
development of socialism in Hungary.4 A less rigorous and at the same time a 
less detailed letter was sent by the Institute of Legal Sciences of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences (Antimonov, Bratus, Sadikov) to Gyula Eörsi in May 
1958 (Bodzási, 2018, fol. 8, pp. 567ff ). 
As highly qualified jurists, although hardly being convinced communists, Pólay 
and Kemenes had important roles in the codification. They were appointed 
professors at the University of Szeged in 1951 and 1961, respectively. Pólay was 
especially renowned as a scholar of Roman law.5 
As for the preparatory materials of the Civil Code of 1959, it is an advanta-
geous recent development that on the basis of a mandate given by the Minister of 
Justice of Hungary these materials stored in the National Archives of Hungary 
were digitalised in 2015 and 2016 (Verebics, 2017, p. 12). These materials, 
amounting to 16,000 pages, were rendered accessible online in 2018 (Bodzási, 
2018). A part of these documents was published in printed form in 2017, and 
the corresponding volumes are also accessible online.6 
The materials mentioned above—typically typed, sometimes written with a 
pen, and sometimes printed—attest that the preparation of the Hungarian Civil 
Code of 1959 was carried out at a highly professional level. Excellent jurists who 
had been educated during the previous era took part in the work and clearly did 
their best. It is characteristic of the high professional standards that both a former 
project of the famous Professor of Roman law, Géza Marton (1880–1957),7 and 
a study written by Ferenc Mádl (1931–2012)8 were taken into account with 
regard to civil liability regulations. 
The coming into being of the socialist equivalent of 
bona fides 
In the framework of the present study, I will deal with the socialist transfor-
mation of two classical principles of private law, namely, that of ‘good faith and 
fair dealing’ (bona fides) and that concerning the prohibition of contracts ‘con-
trary to good morals’ (contra bonos mores). 
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The Bill of a Private Law Code for Hungary, published in 1928 mentioned 
above, contained, similar to the Swiss Civil Code (para. 1 of art. 2), the principle 
of ‘good faith and honesty’ (section 2) and also contained, like the French ‘Civil 
code’ (Code civil) (old art. 1133), the prohibition of contracts ‘contrary to good 
morals and public policy’ (section 973). From 1949 these concepts were re-
garded in Hungary as being incompatible with socialist civil law. These notions 
were regarded as expressions of the relationships of capitalism. This evaluation 
was reflected not only in the Hungarian legal literature of the 1950s but also in 
the subsequent decades. 
Eörsi laid down in his monograph on the development of ownership published 
in 1951 that the principle of good faith applied in the traffic of goods, i.e., ‘good 
faith and fair dealing’ (Treu und Glauben) served as an instrument to moderate 
the impoverishment (‘proletarisation’) of small capitalists and to prevent anarchy. 
He regarded this principle as a reflection of the impotence and class character of 
the imperialist patrimonial law (Eörsi, 1951, II, 65, 388). In a later monograph 
published in 1965, Eörsi ascertained that ‘good faith and fair dealing’ had been 
inserted into the German and Swiss civil codes as an ‘alien body’ since these 
codes reflected the cold business mentality of capitalism. Eörsi added that the 
principle of good faith was a ‘rubber rule’ that generated legal uncertainty (Eörsi, 
1965, p. 72). 
In 1965 a monograph of Imre Sárándi was published about the abuse of rights. 
Sárándi explains that good morals, the habits of an honest man, and good faith and 
fair dealing are bourgeois principles, the content of which is always being estab-
lished in accordance with the current class interests of monopoly capitalists 
(Sárándi, 1965, p. 69). In the following year, a monograph by László Asztalos was 
published on sanctions in civil law. Being a highly qualified jurist, Asztalos was an 
expert on both civil law and legal history. He also considered the principle of 
‘good faith and fair dealing’ to be a symptom of the crisis of monopoly capitalism 
(Asztalos, 1966, p. 153; see similarly Szabó, 1964, p. 99). 
In his comprehensive book on comparative private law published in Hungarian 
in 1975 and also in English in 1979, sometimes called the ‘socialist Zweigert/ 
Kötz,’ Eörsi regarded ‘good faith and fair dealing’ to be the most efficient in-
strument of monopoly capitalist law that served as a ‘Jack of all trades’ (Mädchen 
für alles) (Eörsi, 1975, pp. 452ff; idem, 1979, pp. 476ff ). In 1981 Eörsi eval-
uated the principle of good faith in a more positive manner, at least as regards the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 1980, 
otherwise known as the Vienna Convention. Eörsi welcomed the weakening of 
the former rigor commercialis and expressed his hope that the principle of good 
faith would play a greater role during the actual application of the Convention 
rather than being a compromise merely worked out on paper among the re-
presentatives of the United Nations member states (Eörsi, 1981, pp. 19f ). 
References to the capitalist character of ‘good faith applied in the traffic of 
goods’ can also be found in the preparatory documents of the Civil Code of 
1959. In a document written by Gyula Eörsi and Béla Csánk in 1951, it is 
emphasised that the good faith applied in the traffic of goods is a product of the 
The transformations of some classical principles  29 
constant crisis of capitalism that had to alleviate the antagonistic conflicts espe-
cially in favour of the small capitalists so that they would not become proletar-
ians. The authors ascertained that such conflicts would not arise in people’s 
democracies (Bodzási, 2018, fol. 4, p. 831).9 
Since the principle of ‘good faith and honesty’ laid down in the Bill of 1928 was 
considered a bourgeois concept, it was replaced by new principles in section 4 of 
the new Civil Code. The text of paragraph 1 was published in the following form: 
‘In the course of exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties the parties in civil 
law relations shall display such a conduct that enforcement of their interests shall 
be in harmony with the interest of society.’ 
The coming into being of this passage can be observed very well in the light 
of the preparatory documents. In some versions up to December 1958, the 
reference was not made to the interests of ‘society’ but to those of the ‘com-
munity.’10 Moreover, in the first drafts up until 1957, the expression ‘interest of 
the public’ applied.11 The reference to ‘society’ was in this way the third stage 
in a development during which the drafters were always looking for a better 
expression. I think that the word ‘society’ was finally preferred because as a rather 
abstract notion, it could serve as a milder means regarding the limitation of 
private autonomy. 
Paragraph 2 of section 4 in its published form laid down that ‘[i]n civil law 
relations [the parties] shall cooperate mutually and act in compliance with the 
requirements of socialist coexistence. Cooperation shall be realised by the exact 
fulfilment of duties and by such an enforcement of rights which is in compliance 
with their [social] destination.’ This formulation appeared already in the first 
Draft of 1955. Later only small corrections of a stylistic nature took place. 
The duty of mutual cooperation laid down in this passage can be regarded as a 
progressive idea that spread from the 1950s in Western legal cultures and is 
present also in art. III. 1:104 of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (Bar 
et al., 2009, I, pp. 685ff ). The reference to the requirements of socialist coex-
istence is of ideological nature, but it is not to be regarded as a limitation on 
private autonomy but much more as a principle requiring consideration of the 
interests of other persons and in this way it constitutes continuity with the classic 
principles of good faith and honesty.12 
The next phrase contains strict rules concerning both parties of the civil law 
relations. The requirement of exact fulfilment of duties is in a way contrary to the 
classical principle of good faith, which sometimes renders possible a milder 
treatment of the debtor’s duties (cf. Brox, 2000, p. 149; idem, 1984, p. 91; 
Medicus, 1999, p. 113). It is to be noted that the vision of a negligent debtor 
could have a role when drafting this rule, against whom the legislator had to 
protect the other party. The reference to the exercise of rights is a sign of a 
significant extension of the prohibition of chicane in socialist civil law, which is 
more thoroughly explained in section 5 treating the abuse of rights. 
In the first versions of the Draft, a third paragraph in section 4 laid down that 
‘[t]he socialist organisations exercise their rights in order to fulfil their duties 
based upon the plan of the people’s economy’ (see the Draft of 1955 in Bodzási, 
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2018, fol. 16, p. 233). This paragraph, however, was deleted at the end of 1956 
or somewhat later and was not included in the final text.13 The deletion of this 
paragraph is a sign that the socialist character of the draft of the Civil Code was 
moderated.14 
In the first Drafts, such provisions in section 4 were substituted for the former 
principle of good faith and honesty. One similarity to para. 2 section 2 of the Bill 
of 1928 is that section 4 of all versions of the draft was followed by a section 5 
containing the prohibition of the abuse of rights, albeit the effectiveness of the 
prohibition was significantly extended. 
Neither the expression ‘good faith’ nor the word ‘honesty’ appeared in the 
various versions of section 4. ‘Fair dealing’ is not mentioned in these texts, either. 
It is still more remarkable that not even the first versions of the rationale contain 
any reference to the fact that section 4 was substituted for the former principle of 
good faith and honesty.15 
As referred to briefly above, these classical notions were omitted since they 
were regarded as reflections of capitalism. On the contrary, emphasis was laid on 
collective aspects, namely on the interests of society, and on the relationships 
between parties, especially on their duty of cooperation. At the same time, only 
the expression ‘socialist coexistence’ has an explicit ideological connotation in 
these provisions. 
During the preparation of the Civil Code, proposals were made suggesting 
preserving some reference to good faith. Among the preparatory materials, a 
voluminous study amounting to 100 pages can be found that was presented in 
November 1957 by judge Kornél Berndt. This study contained an explicit 
proposal to insert into the Civil Code the principle of good faith and honesty 
with reference to a similar provision in the Bill of 1928 (Bodzási, 2018, fol. 16, 
p. 72).16 It is not surprising that this proposal was rejected. It is in fact more 
remarkable that the Bill of 1928 could be referred to as a model. In this era, the 
entire old Hungarian law was regarded by a number of influential communist 
jurists to be an obsolete reflection of capitalism with some surviving elements of 
feudalism. Indeed, in the 1950s, the interwar period was often referred to as the 
era of Horthy fascism.17 
In the beginning of 1959, the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, Endre Sík 
(1891–1978), proposed that the presumption of good faith should be inserted 
into the Preliminary provisions of the Civil Code, similar to section 3 of the Bill 
of 1928. This proposal was rejected with the explanation that the new code 
would have a more severe regulation and, in some cases, even the presumption of 
bad faith had to apply. Such an inverse presumption of bad faith could be fea-
sible, in particular, if ‘capitalist elements’ were concerned who were, however, 
slowly disappearing from Hungarian society (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 8, p. 107). 
Even if such conservative efforts failed, they had still some consequences, 
namely, some surrogates for the missing classical principle of good faith and 
honesty were finally inserted into the Civil Code. At the end of 1957 or some-
what later, somebody noted the Latin word nemo written in pen in a copy of the 
Draft published in printed form in the autumn of 1957, in the rationale of 
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section 4 (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 11, p. 701). This was obviously a reference to 
the maxim ‘no one alleging his own turpitude is to be heard’ (nemo suam tur-
pitudinem allegans auditur). As a consequence, in the Draft of December 1958, 
a third paragraph appeared in the text of section 4, laying down that ‘[n]obody 
can rely on their own misfeasance in order to acquire an advantage. […]’ (See 
Bodzási, 2018, fol. 14, p. 4.) 
A further supplement concerning good faith and honesty appeared in the Draft 
published in the autumn of 1957. It is in the third paragraph inserted into section 5, 
which deals with the abuse of rights. The new provision laid down that ‘[t]he court 
may obligate to full or partial reparation the person whose intentional behaviour has 
induced another person in good faith to such an action whereby the latter has 
suffered a damage through no fault of his own.’ This paragraph became in the Draft 
of December 1958 the separate section 6 (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 14, p. 4). This 
state of affairs is known as ‘implicit conduct,’ and it preserved its position and 
wording also in the published version.18 The text of the provision as well as the 
rationale to the (final) section 6 attest that the ‘implicit conduct’ was really a sur-
rogate for the lack of good faith. The text of the provision contains an explicit 
reference to the ‘good faith’ of the possible plaintiff and the rationale refers several 
times to the importance of ‘confidence in good faith.’ 
Can we say that the classical principle of good faith and honesty could survive 
in a way in the Civil Code of 1959 due to the provision on implicit conduct? I am 
afraid that the answer to this question has to be negative since the good faith 
referred to hereby is the so-called subjective good faith (in German guter 
Glaube), while the classical principle of good faith and honesty is connected with 
the objective good faith (in German Treu und Glauben).19 
A further impact of the conservative proposals mentioned above can be verified 
in the ministerial rationale to the Bill of 1959 which was later published together 
with the norm text of the Civil Code. While the former drafts of the rationale did 
not refer to this problem at all, the rationale in its final form observes that the Bill 
does not lay down the presumption of good faith, although such a presumption 
can be found in the Bill of 1928, in many bourgeois civil codes and also in article 5 
of the ‘Polish General Part’ of 1950 (of a Polish civil code being that time 
scheduled only). The further explication treating ‘good faith and fair dealing’ as 
well as the good faith of the possessor without any distinction shows that the 
drafter of the rationale was unable to distinguish between the subjective and the 
objective meanings of good faith (Hungarian Civil Code of 1959, hereinafter 
HCC, 1959, p. 25). 
Even if considering the confusion of the meanings of good faith in the ra-
tionale, it was advantageous that the norm text of the Hungarian Civil Code of 
1959 emphasised some objective standards instead of laying down the principle 
of good faith and honesty. Thanks to this solution, in the subsequent decades, 
there was no Hungarian jurist who would have confused the objective and the 
subjective senses of good faith, at least not within Hungarian civil law. The 
terminology applied by the Civil Code of 1959 guaranteed that good faith meant 
only (or overwhelmingly) the subjective state of mind, while the principle of 
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objective good faith (and honesty) had an entirely different terminology. The 
advantage of the solution preferred in the Hungarian Civil Code of 1959 is 
obvious if we compare it with para. 3 of art. 1134 of the French Code civil of 
1804 (abrogated in 2016) that laid down that ‘the contracts shall be performed 
bona fide’ ([e]lles [viz. les conventions—A. F.] doivent être exécutées de bonne 
foi). This provision, namely the ambiguous term bonne foi, constituted one 
source of confusion concerning subjective and objective good faith in French 
civil law (cf. Tallon, 1994, p. 12). 
Developments since the Novel of 1977 
As far as the subsequent fate of section 4 is concerned, during the preparation of 
the Novel of 1977, László Asztalos proposed that the prohibition of unfair 
business activity and unfair profit making be inserted into the preliminary pro-
visions (Asztalos, 1976, p. 120). A more radical proposal was made by Imre 
Sárándi, who suggested laying down the principle of exercising rights and duties 
in compliance with their destination and in good faith (Sárándi, 1977, pp. 35ff ). 
Asztalos’s proposal was accepted to some extent and the Novel (Act No. IV of 
1977) laid down the prohibition of unfair business activity in para. 2 of section 4. 
Sárándi’s proposal including the restoration of the principle of good faith could 
not be accepted at that time.20 
As far as the background of the Novel of 1977 is concerned, in 1968 a sig-
nificant modification of the regulation of the economy took place in Hungary, 
namely, the so-called ‘new economic mechanism’ was introduced that was 
aimed at diminishing the role of central planning and at increasing the role of 
market relations. 
It was only Act XIV of 1991 that later restored the classical principle of good 
faith and honesty overwriting para. 1 of section 4. Since ‘good faith’ meant in 
Hungarian civil law for some decades (between 1960 and 1991) an exclusively 
subjective notion, the restoration of the classical principle caused considerable 
misunderstandings. Most jurists did not remember the principle of ‘good faith and 
honesty’ as being formerly fixed by the Bill of 1928 (Földi, 2003, pp. 82ff ). An 
amendment, namely Act No. III of 2006, was required to make matters less am-
biguous, both by means of some slight corrections of the relating terminology and 
through the relating rationale, namely that in Hungarian civil law objective and 
subjective good faith are to be distinguished (Földi, 2007, pp. 53ff ). In the new 
Hungarian Civil Code (Act. No. V of 2013), the same terminology applies (para. 1 
of section 1:3; cf. Földi, 2016, pp. 173ff ). 
The coming into being of the socialist equivalent of  
boni mores 
The Bill of 1928, mentioned several times above, contained not only the principle 
of good faith and honesty (its section 3, being similar to art. 2 of the Swiss Civil 
Code) but also, similar to the French civil code (Code civil) (old art. 1133),21 
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the prohibition of contracts ‘contrary to good morals and public policy’ (section 
973). Just as the principle of good faith and honesty was not compatible with 
socialist ideas, so, too, this was the case with regard to boni mores. That is why a 
new provision was substituted for boni mores in para. 2 of section 200 of the Civil 
Code of 1959 with the following wording: ‘Any contract contrary to legal rules or 
made to elude the legal rules is rendered null and void unless a legal rule attaches 
different legal consequences to it. A contract is likewise null and void when it is 
evidently contrary to the interests of the working people or to the requirements of 
socialist coexistence.’ 
This ruling came into being as a result of a development that had several 
stages. In the first draft of the law of obligations made in July 1953,22 there was a 
shorter formulation according to which ‘[a] contract is null and void if it is 
contrary to legal rules or made to elude the legal rules or is not in the interests of 
the working people in some other way.’ (See Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 8.) 
In the draft of the law of obligations of October 1954 signed by Nizsalovszky, 
Világhy, and Eörsi, three further states of affairs were added to the first version of 
the new rule. One of them was a reference to the contracts contrary to the 
planned tasks of both parties. A further type of nullity was constituted by 
contracts contrary to the requirements of socialist coexistence, and a third case 
was constituted by the contracts aimed to damage the state (see Bodzási, 2018, 
fol. 19, p. 74). 
The reference to the interests of the working people was modified in the 
version in question by inserting the adverb ‘evidently.’ This addition could have 
been inspired by art. 2 of the Swiss Civil Code,23 and it obviously served to 
increase the certainty of the law. This modification is a little sign of the political 
changes after Stalin’s death in 1953. 
Moreover, the codification commission wished for a reference to ‘socialist 
morals’ to be added to the wording of the law (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 74). 
This proposal does not seem to have any echo in the later materials. It is strange 
that the word ‘morals’ was not acceptable even though accompanied by the 
word ‘socialist.’ 
It was Gyula Eörsi who inserted (in ink) the word ‘determined’ before the 
words ‘planned tasks’ in a copy of the September 1955 Draft. At the same time, 
Eörsi also added (again in ink) that the reference to damaging the state should be 
discussed (for both corrections by Eörsi see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 174). 
These proposals were also aimed to increase the certainty of the law that Eörsi felt 
was being endangered by such general clauses. 
In a later version of the Draft probably at the end of 1955, the reference to the 
conflict with planned tasks was struck out in ink but the reference to damaging 
the state was left untouched (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 17, p. 1). In a somewhat 
later version of the Draft, which no longer contained a reference to the planned 
tasks, the reference to damaging the state was also struck out in ink (see Bodzási, 
2018, fol. 19, p. 218). 
In spite of the corrections aimed to increase the legal certainty, critical ob-
servations were made that the reference to ‘fraudulent intention to evade the law’ 
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(in fraudem legis agere) was not exact enough.24 According to another, more 
radical criticism, the reference to the conflict with the interests of working 
people and the requirements of socialist coexistence would be superfluous since 
the corresponding cases were covered by the prohibition of contracts contrary to 
legal rules as well as contracts made ‘in circumvention of the rules of law’ (in 
fraudem legis). Furthermore, according to this criticism, these general clauses 
were dangerous as they made it possible to pass arbitrary sentences.25 
These concerns, which can sometimes appear nowadays, did not have any 
impact on the legislation. The text formulated in the Draft of September 1956 
(para. 2 of section 181 [later 200], see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 11, p. 59) was also 
preserved in the later versions and if compared with the final enacted version 
reveals only minor modifications of a stylistic character. 
The ministerial rationale of the Bill of 1959, published together with the norm 
text of the Civil Code, referred explicitly to the fact that the reference to the 
conflict with the interests of the working people and with the requirements of 
socialist coexistence was substituted for the former prohibition of contracts 
contrary to good morals (HCC, 1959, p. 154). 
Developments since the Novel of 1977 
In the Novel of 1977, a more timely reference was substituted for the ‘working 
people,’ namely, ‘society.’ It was only the Novel of 1991 mentioned above in 
which the prohibition of contracts ‘against good morals’ (contra bonos mores) was 
substituted for the modified socialist formula in section 200, preserving, how-
ever, from the socialist definition the restrictive adverb ‘evidently.’ At the same 
time, the former reference to the ‘public order’ known in the respective provision 
of the Bill of 1928 was omitted by the Novel of 1991. Therefore, the Novel in 
question did not restore the formula of the Bill of 1928 completely. The new 
Hungarian Civil Code (Act No. V of 2013) has preserved the provision in-
troduced in 1991 (section 6:96; cf. Földi, 2016, pp. 183f ). 
The judicature dealt thoroughly with the problem, in which cases an evident 
conflict with the interests of society or with the requirements of social coex-
istence could be verified. The selling of real estates of the state at a low price in 
bad faith was a typical case of violation of the interests of society. Violation of the 
requirements of socialist coexistence was verified when a person who was aware 
of the grave illness and bad medical prognosis of the other party concluded with 
him or her a contract for support (maintenance) or for life annuity in order to 
acquire the other party’s apartment at a low cost.26 
Conclusions 
Drawing some general conclusions, we can ascertain that the socialist transfor-
mation of some classical principles of civil law in Hungary did not cause extremely 
grave damage. The contents of bona fides as well as that of boni mores were 
translated into a new and sometimes surprising language, but the changes can also 
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be seen as a kind of modernisation. The details of application of these general 
clauses of ancient origin sometimes became more understandable. Moreover, in 
the case of bona fides, the transformation was useful, namely, in order to avoid the 
confusion of the subjective and objective meanings of good faith. It should be 
noted that the traditional technical term ‘good faith’ itself is very problematical and 
has constituted a source of misunderstandings for many centuries (Juenger, 1995, 
p. 1253; Földi, 2007, pp. 53ff ). It is less understandable why in socialist 
Hungarian civil law the notion of ‘morals’ could not apply even with the attribute 
‘socialist’ either, despite such proposals attested by the preparatory materials. 
As for the background of the low level of ‘communist distortions’ appearing in 
the codification of the HCC of 1959, several advantageous circumstances can be 
mentioned. The members of the codification commission were jurists qualified at 
a very high professional level in the period before the Second World War. They 
often represented a higher professional level than many of the jurists trained later 
in the socialist era, having to create the new ‘capitalist’ private law of Hungary 
after 1990. This inverse development of the recent past has not been less para-
doxical than the former situation was in the 1950s. 
Most of the members of the codification commission of the HCC of 1959 
were not engaged communists or at least not before 1945. Some of them as-
sumed the task because of opportunism. It has to be added, however, that the 
former regime known as Horthy era (1920–1944) became odious not only be-
cause of the tragic events that happened during the last years of the war. With 
regard to the adverse antecedents, the communist regime did not seem so much 
unacceptable in the time of its emergence as it seems nowadays. 
As far as the preparatory materials allow us to judge it, the Soviet Union 
controlled the process of codification in an absolutely soft way. No detailed 
translations of the drafts were sent to Soviet jurists. There are only a very few 
direct references to the Soviet law in the preparatory materials. The more re-
markable is that a number of references to the Bill of 1928 can be found in the 
same documents. These references are not always negative. As attested by the 
preparatory materials, the socialist features of the draft were moderated both 
after Stalin’s death (1953) and after the revolution of 1956. 
Naturally there were strict limits determining the socialist character of the 
codification. As referred to above, neither the notion of good faith and fair 
dealing nor that of the good morals could be mentioned in the norm text of 
the HCC until 1991. They might be referred to only in the rationale. These 
‘bourgeois’ notions could not be admitted in the Novel of 1977 either, in 
spite of repeated proposals, albeit also this Novel reduced a bit the socialist 
character of some of the provisions in question. There was a slow, by no means a 
continuous, but in any case a long process of erosion of socialist character of the 
provisions limiting the private autonomy. 
Finally, it was fortunate that the codification of the Hungarian Civil Code of 
1959 was led by two highly qualified jurists, M. Világhy and Gy. Eörsi. Having 
become communists despite their ‘bourgeois’ roots, they had the political in-
fluence to retain a great many elements of the civil law tradition in Hungary. 
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Notes  
1 Commercial law was regulated in Hungary by the independent Commercial Code 
of 1875, cf. Zlinszky, 1985, p. 435, p. 441.  
2 On the basis of political considerations the communist regime distinguished a 
number of ‘strata’ of ‘bourgeois’ scholars and applied different treatment towards 
them. Some older professors like Endre Nizsalovszky (private law), Géza Marton 
(Roman law), or Ferenc Eckhart (legal history) could keep their chairs; 
Nizsalovszky and Marton could also keep their membership in the Academy of 
Sciences. Other professors appointed before 1944, e.g., Sándor Kornél Tury 
(Professor of Commercial Law in Budapest), were sent to the Institute of 
Administrative and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences so that 
they would not disturb the ideological development of the students. Tury had the 
opportunity to make observations on the drafts of the new Civil Code; see, e.g., 
Bodzási, 2018 [http://impp.mhk.hu/document/view/id=17], p. 192 (as for 
the following references to the Preparatory Materials, the number of the corre-
sponding folder and that of the electronic page will only be given). The case of 
István Szászy (Professor of Private Law and Private International Law in 
Budapest, known also as Étienne de Szászy) was peculiar because he was forced to 
retire in 1951 but he did not lose his membership in the Academy of Sciences. In 
the 1950s, he could earn money as a translator. From the 1960s, a number of his 
monographs were published in Hungary in English. See Burián, 2001, pp. 147ff.  
3 The role or even the raison d’être of the general part was discussed in Soviet legal 
literature as well as in some other socialist countries. A letter sent by the Secretary 
of State of the East German (GDR) Ministry of Justice, Dr. Toeplitz, to the 
Hungarian Minister of Justice in February 1959 seems to be sceptical as regards 
the rejection of the general part. Dr. Toeplitz was curious about the arguments 
for this solution being discussed in the GDR, see the original letter in Bodzási, 
2018, fol. 8, pp. 781ff. A head of department, István Timár answered that the 
system of the civil code did not have to be identical with the scientific system of 
civil law and the latter necessarily contained a general part. See Timár’s letter sent 
in April 1959 in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 8, p. 785ff.  
4 I did not find the original text of Venediktov’s letter. Among the preparatory 
materials published recently a Hungarian translation can be found, see Bodzási, 
2018, fol. 8, pp. 570ff. This document does not contain any reference to whom 
the letter was sent.  
5 For the scientific oeuvre of Pólay, see Éva Jakab’s study in this volume. A folder of 
the preparatory materials of the Civil Code of 1959 contains Elemér Pólay’s 
offprint from the Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae (vol. 5 
[1957]; this is a study entitled Die Blütezeit des römischen Wirtschaftslebens und 
die klassiche Zeit des römischen Rechts) dedicated to Béla Kemenes on the February 
15, 1958 (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 23, p. 704). It is, however, not probable that 
this study could be used during the codification work, and Pólay’s study can be 
regarded here as a kind of ‘textus fugitivus.’ The preparatory materials attest that 
Pólay made several proposals in order to preserve as many classical institutions as 
possible in the new Civil Code, see, e.g., Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 963.  
6 See http://impp.mhk.hu/document/view/id=49.  
7 See G. Marton, Tervezet egy polgári törvénykönyv kártérítési fejezetéhez (A draft of 
the chapter on damages of a new Civil Code) in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 17, 
pp. 257–329. Marton’s draft was first published (in a different version) in his 
posthumous monograph: Marton, 1992, pp. 298–327. For more on Géza 
Marton himself, see Szabó, 2001, pp. 424f.; Hamza, 2009, pp. 398f.  
8 See F. Mádl, Az objektív felelősségi rendszer történelmi kialakulása (Historical 
formation of the system of strict liability) in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 23, pp. 640–703. 
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Ferenc Mádl was a professor at the Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest); a 
member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; and, between 2000 and 2005, 
President of the Republic of Hungary.  
9 This document was written for the professional and political training of jurists in 
the framework of a conference organised by the Department of Codification of 
the Ministry of Justice; see the cover on p. 822 (Bodzási, 2018, fol. 4).  
10 So still in the Draft of December 12, 1958 in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 14, p. 4. In this 
copy, however, the word ‘community’ is crossed out in pencil and the word 
‘society’ is substituted. In another copy, the same correction was made with a 
pen, see ibid. p. 498.  
11 See a copy of the Draft of 1955 with corrections made in both pen and pencil. 
Bodzási, 2018, fol. 16, p. 351. This correction was made prior to July 27, 1957, 
cf. ibid. p. 374.  
12 Gy. Eörsi in Eörsi and Gellért, 1981, I, 49 observes that the socialist character of 
the cooperation laid down in section 4 means that the parties shall not be only 
neutral or peaceful as regards the other party’s interests (as is the case in bourgeois 
legal systems) but they shall carry out activity as well if it is necessary in the given 
case. As an example, Eörsi refers to a judgment passed in 1970 according to which 
a special (remedial) recreation home, if being specialised also for receiving motor- 
disabled guests, should put carpets on the floor so that walking is made safer.  
13 A section crossed out with red pencil can be found in a copy of the Draft of 
September 1956 (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 11, p. 247). In the Draft published in 
autumn 1957 this provision is already omitted (see ibid. p. 699). ‘Enterprises ha[d] 
to report on the state of plan fulfilment of the annual plan every quarter or even at 
shorter intervals,’ see Földi, 1992, II, p. 582.  
14 The Novel of 1977 inserted a new provision into section 4 in which the idea of 
the planned economy reappeared. This modification was, however, in connection 
with the liberalisation of the economy. 
15 See the Draft Rationale of Spring 1957 in Bodzási, 2018, fol. 12, pp. 15f; si-
milarly in the (printed) Draft Rationale of August 1957 in fol. 2, p. 113 as well as 
in the (printed) Draft Rationale of Autumn of 1957 in fol. 11, p. 701, p. 974.  
16 Berndt also made further conservative proposals, e.g., to receive sections 4–7 of the 
Bill of 1928 as well as to include also family law in the Civil Code; see ibid. 
fol. 16, p. 44.  
17 A prominent representative of this course was also the internationally well- 
known legal philosopher and comparatist Imre Szabó (1912–1991), Director of 
the Institute of Administrative and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences. In 1955 Szabó published a controversial monograph radically con-
demning the older Hungarian legal philosophy. Szabó stated in a conference on 
the civil law codification in his Institute on February 14, 1957, that the Draft 
Rationale contained too many historical elements while the earlier Hungarian 
private law should be forgotten and the new Civil Code as a tabula rasa should 
not be interpreted on the basis of the former judicature but on its own basis, in 
accordance with the principles of the people’s democracy (see Bodzási, 2018, 
fol. 21, p. 1360).  
18 Currently, in the new Hungarian Civil Code adopted as Act V of 2013, the 
implicit conduct is no longer regulated in the Preliminary provisions but in the 
chapter entitled ‘Further facts generating an obligation,’ and specifically in section 
6:587. Such a transplant was earlier suggested in 1958 by the Supreme Court (see 
Bodzási, 2018, fol. 8, p. 491) as well as by Endre Nizsalovszky, with reference to 
the variae causarum figurae of Roman law (see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 9, p. 116). 
Nizsalovszky ascertained, however, that the implicit conduct does not belong to 
the conducts causing damage. 
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19 At this point it is necessary to refer to the problem of the different interpretations 
of good faith in various legal cultures. A number of jurisdictions firmly differ-
entiate between (1) subjective good faith characterised by belief in the lawfulness 
of one’s possession, etc. (in German guter Glaube) and (2) objective good faith 
and fair dealing (in German Treu und Glauben). The dualist interpretation derives 
from the older ius commune, but it gained importance only as a consequence of a 
monograph by Wächter, 1871. Since then the dualist interpretation has been 
embraced the world over. For a detailed treatment, see Földi, 2007, pp. 53ff; 
idem, SZ Rom. Abt. 124 (2007), pp. 603ff; idem, 2010, pp. 483ff; idem, 2014, 
pp. 312ff. See also, e.g., Martins-Costa 2015, pp. 40ff; Novaretti, 2010, pp. 953ff. 
Before the global spread of a dualist interpretation, a kind of ‘subjective monism’ 
prevailed which regards good faith always as a subjective state of mind. Besides 
these interpretations a kind of ‘objective monism’ is also known, which is domi-
nant in Austrian law in which good faith is called Redlichkeit. As for the future, it 
cannot be ruled out that a pluralist interpretation will become predominant, 
which acknowledges various meanings of good faith. Cf. Zimmermann and 
Whittaker, 2000, pp. 690ff. Cardilli, Dajczak, Fiori, Stolfi and Zannini warn of the 
dangers of a dualist interpretation, see Garofalo 2003, and cf., with detailed 
bibliographic data, Földi, SZ Rom. Abt. 124 (2007), pp. 603ff, idem, 2007, 
pp. 53ff.  
20 The Novel of 1977 inserted into para. 1 of section 4 a second phrase, which laid 
down that ‘[e]conomic organisations shall act in their civil law relations in 
compliance with the requirements of the planned and proportional development 
of the people’s economy.’ The same Novel inserted into para. 4 of section 4 a first 
phrase, according to which ‘[un]less this Act provides a stricter requirement, one 
has to proceed in civil law relations as it may generally be expected in the 
given situation.’  
21 As is generally known, in 2016 an important reform of the French Code civil in 
some places deleted references to bonnes mœurs.  
22 As observed in the preliminary remarks, the Department of Codification thought 
that it was feasible to create a draft of the law of obligation, i.e. not in the fra-
mework of a civil code, see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 2. See also Eörsi’s note in 
the same sense in a copy of a draft of 1953 (written in ink), ibid. p. 39.  
23 See para. 2 of section 2 of the Swiss ZGB: ‘Der offenbare Missbrauch eines 
Rechtes findet keinen Rechtsschutz.’ The official translation is: ‘The manifest 
abuse of a right is not protected by law.’ It is to be noted that the corresponding 
provision in the Bill of 1928 (para. 2 of section 2) inspired otherwise by the Swiss 
Civil Code, did not contain the attribute ‘manifest.’  
24 This observation was made by the Legal Department of the Hungarian National 
Bank in February 1955, see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 1166. It is remarkable that 
the most Western civil codes do not declare the prohibition of in fraudem legis 
agere, except the Italian Codice civile of 1942 in its art. 1344 (contratto in frode 
alla legge). This prohibition can be traced back to Roman law, see Paul. 
D. 1.3.29. 
25 This criticism was made by an attorney called László Sarlós at an official con-
ference held in Szekszárd in January 1958, moderated by Professor Lóránt Rudolf 
(University of Pécs), see Bodzási, 2018, fol. 19, p. 1261. A similar criticism was 
presented by a public prosecutor named Gyula Zoltay at another official con-
ference held in Győr in January 1958, moderated by the Vice President of the 
Supreme Court, László Sztodolnik, see ibid. p. 1268. 
26 See K. Benedek in Eörsi and Gellért, 1981, I, p. 920 for data on related judge-
ments. See more recently Menyhárd, 2004, pp. 31f; Deli, 2014, pp. 11ff.  
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